

115TH CONGRESS
2D SESSION

S. _____

To develop a long-term strategic vision and a comprehensive, multifaceted, and principled United States policy for the Indo-Pacific region, and for other purposes.

IN THE SENATE OF THE UNITED STATES

Mr. GARDNER (for himself, Mr. MARKEY, Mr. RUBIO, and Mr. CARDIN) introduced the following bill; which was read twice and referred to the Committee on _____

A BILL

To develop a long-term strategic vision and a comprehensive, multifaceted, and principled United States policy for the Indo-Pacific region, and for other purposes.

1 *Be it enacted by the Senate and House of Representa-*
2 *tives of the United States of America in Congress assembled,*

3 **SECTION 1. SHORT TITLE; TABLE OF CONTENTS.**

4 (a) SHORT TITLE.—This Act may be cited as the
5 “Asia Reassurance Initiative Act of 2018”.

6 (b) TABLE OF CONTENTS.—The table of contents for
7 this Act is as follows:

Sec. 1. Short title; table of contents.

Sec. 2. Findings.

2

Sec. 3. Statement of policy on United States engagement in the Indo-Pacific region.

TITLE I—PROMOTING UNITED STATES SECURITY INTERESTS IN
THE INDO-PACIFIC REGION

- Sec. 101. Authorization of appropriations.
 Sec. 102. Treaty alliances in the Indo-Pacific region.
 Sec. 103. United States-China relationship.
 Sec. 104. United States-India strategic partnership.
 Sec. 105. United States-ASEAN strategic partnership.
 Sec. 106. United States-Republic of Korea-Japan trilateral security partnership.
 Sec. 107. Quadilateral security dialogue.
 Sec. 108. Enhanced security partnerships in Southeast Asia.
 Sec. 109. Commitment to Taiwan.
 Sec. 110. North Korea strategy.
 Sec. 111. New Zealand and the Pacific islands.
 Sec. 112. Freedom of navigation and overflight; promotion of international law.
 Sec. 113. Combating terrorism in Southeast Asia.
 Sec. 114. Cybersecurity cooperation.
 Sec. 115. Nuclear nonproliferation and arms control in the Indo-Pacific region.

TITLE II—PROMOTING UNITED STATES ECONOMIC INTERESTS IN
THE INDO-PACIFIC REGION

- Sec. 201. Findings; sense of Congress.
 Sec. 202. Trade negotiations, multilateral agreements, and regional economic summits.
 Sec. 203. United States-ASEAN Economic Partnership.
 Sec. 204. Trade capacity building and trade facilitation.
 Sec. 205. Intellectual property protection.
 Sec. 206. Energy programs and initiatives.
 Sec. 207. Lower Mekong Initiative.

TITLE III—PROMOTING UNITED STATES VALUES IN THE INDO-
PACIFIC REGION

- Sec. 301. Findings.
 Sec. 302. Trafficking-in-persons.
 Sec. 303. Bilateral and regional dialogues; people-to-people engagement.
 Sec. 304. Imposition of sanctions and suspension of United States assistance.
 Sec. 305. Authorization of appropriations.

1 **SEC. 2. FINDINGS.**

2 Congress makes the following findings:

3 (1) The Indo-Pacific region—

4 (A) represents nearly 1/2 of the global pop-
 5 ulation;

1 (B) is home to some of the most dynamic
2 economies in the world; and

3 (C) poses security challenges that threaten
4 to undermine United States' national security
5 interests, regional peace, and global stability.

6 (2) The core tenants of the United States-
7 backed international system are being challenged
8 with increasingly coercive behavior, including—

9 (A) China's illegal construction and mili-
10 tarization of artificial features in the South
11 China Sea;

12 (B) North Korea's acceleration of its nu-
13 clear and ballistic missile capabilities; and

14 (C) the increased presence throughout
15 Southeast Asia of the Islamic State (referred to
16 in this Act as "ISIS") and other international
17 terrorist organizations that threaten the United
18 States.

19 (3) The economic order in the Indo-Pacific re-
20 gion continues to transform, presenting both oppor-
21 tunities and challenges to United States economic
22 interests.

23 (4) The United States has a fundamental inter-
24 est in defending human rights and promoting the
25 rule of law in the Indo-Pacific region. Although

1 many countries in that region have improved the
2 treatment of their citizens, several Indo-Pacific
3 countries continue to be human rights abusers and
4 there are serious concerns with political rights and
5 civil liberties throughout the Indo-Pacific region.

6 (5) Without strong leadership from the United
7 States, the international system, fundamentally root-
8 ed in the rule of law, may wither, to the detriment
9 of United States, regional, and global interests. It is
10 imperative that the United States continue to play
11 a leading role in the Indo-Pacific region by—

- 12 (A) defending peace and security;
13 (B) advancing economic prosperity; and
14 (C) promoting respect for fundamental
15 human rights.

16 (6) In 2017, the Subcommittee on East Asia,
17 the Pacific, and International Cybersecurity Policy
18 of the Committee on Foreign Relations of the Senate
19 held a series of hearings on United States leadership
20 in the Indo-Pacific region, in which—

- 21 (A) experts, including Representative
22 Randy Forbes, Ambassador Robert Gallucci,
23 Ms. Tami Overby, Dr. Robert Orr, Ambassador
24 Derek Mitchell, Ambassador Robert King, Mr.
25 Murray Hiebert, and others detailed the secu-

1 rity challenges, economic opportunities, and im-
2 peratives of promoting rule of law, human
3 rights, and democracy, in the Indo-Pacific re-
4 gion; and

5 (B) Dr. Graham Allison, the Douglas Dil-
6 lon Professor of Government at the John F.
7 Kennedy School of Government at Harvard
8 University, testified, “As realistic students of
9 history, Chinese leaders recognize that the role
10 the U.S. has played since World War II as the
11 architect and underwriter of regional stability
12 and security has been essential to the rise of
13 Asia, including China itself. But they believe
14 that as the tide that brought the U.S. to Asia
15 recedes, America must leave with it. Much as
16 Britain’s role in the Western Hemisphere faded
17 at the beginning of the twentieth century, so
18 must America’s role in Asia as the region’s his-
19 toric superpower resumes its place.”.

20 (7) The United States National Security Strat-
21 egy (referred to in this Act as the “National Secu-
22 rity Strategy”), which was released in December
23 2017, states—

24 (A) “A geopolitical competition between
25 free and repressive visions of world order is tak-

1 ing place in the Indo-Pacific region. The region,
2 which stretches from the west coast of India to
3 the western shores of the United States, rep-
4 resents the most populous and economically dy-
5 namic part of the world. The U.S. interest in
6 a free and open Indo-Pacific extends back to
7 the earliest days of our republic.”; and

8 (B) “Our vision for the Indo-Pacific ex-
9 cludes no nation. We will redouble our commit-
10 ment to established alliances and partnerships,
11 while expanding and deepening relationships
12 with new partners that share respect for sov-
13 ereignty, fair and reciprocal trade, and the rule
14 of law. We will reinforce our commitment to
15 freedom of the seas and the peaceful resolution
16 of territorial and maritime disputes in accord-
17 ance with international law. We will work with
18 allies and partners to achieve complete,
19 verifiable, and irreversible denuclearization on
20 the Korean Peninsula and preserve the non-pro-
21 liferation regime in Northeast Asia.”.

22 **SEC. 3. STATEMENT OF POLICY ON UNITED STATES EN-**
23 **GAGEMENT IN THE INDO-PACIFIC REGION.**

24 It is the policy of the United States to develop, and
25 to commit to, a long-term strategic vision and a com-

1 prehensive, multifaceted, and principled United States pol-
2 icy for the Indo-Pacific region that—

3 (1) preserves peace through strength by secur-
4 ing the vital national security interests of the United
5 States;

6 (2) promotes American prosperity by advancing
7 the economic interests of the United States;

8 (3) advances American influence by reflecting
9 the values of the American people and universal
10 human rights; and

11 (4) accords with and supports the rule of law
12 and international norms.

13 **TITLE I—PROMOTING UNITED**
14 **STATES SECURITY INTERESTS**
15 **IN THE INDO-PACIFIC REGION**

16 **SEC. 101. AUTHORIZATION OF APPROPRIATIONS.**

17 (a) IN GENERAL.—There are authorized to be appro-
18 priated for the Department of State, the United States
19 Agency for International Development, and, as appro-
20 priate, the Department of Defense \$1,500,000,000 for
21 each of the fiscal years 2019 through 2023, which shall
22 be used—

23 (1) to advance United States foreign policy in-
24 terests and objectives in the Indo-Pacific region in
25 recognition of the value of diplomatic initiatives and

1 programs in the furtherance of United States strat-
2 egy;

3 (2) to bolster the United States military pres-
4 ence and readiness in the Indo-Pacific region for the
5 purpose of deterring and defending against provoca-
6 tive actions, including by improving the defense in-
7 frastructure and critical munitions stockpiles of the
8 United States Armed Forces;

9 (3) to improve the defense capacity of partner
10 nations to resist coercion and to deter and defend
11 against security threats, including through foreign
12 military financing and international military edu-
13 cation and training programs;

14 (4) to conduct regular bilateral and multilateral
15 exercises, particularly with our most highly-capable
16 allies and partners, to meet strategic challenges, in-
17 cluding—

18 (A) certain destabilizing activities of the
19 People’s Republic of China; and

20 (B) emerging threats, such as the nuclear
21 and ballistic missile programs of the Demo-
22 cratic People’s Republic of Korea;

23 (5) to build new counterterrorism partnership
24 programs in Southeast Asia to combat the growing
25 presence of ISIS and other terrorist organizations

1 that pose a significant threat to the United States,
2 our allies, and our citizens' interests abroad; and

3 (6) to increase maritime domain awareness pro-
4 grams in Southeast Asia—

5 (A) by expanding the scope of naval and
6 coast guard training efforts with Southeast
7 Asian countries;

8 (B) through intelligence sharing and other
9 information-sharing efforts; and

10 (C) through multilateral exercises, includ-
11 ing by involving Japan, Australia, and India in
12 such efforts and exercises.

13 (b) COUNTERING CHINA'S INFLUENCE TO UNDER-
14 MINE THE INTERNATIONAL SYSTEM.—Amounts appro-
15 priated pursuant to subsection (a) shall be made available
16 for United States Government efforts to counter the stra-
17 tegic influence of the People's Republic of China, in ac-
18 cordance with the strategy required under section
19 7043(e)(3) of the Department of State, Foreign Oper-
20 ations, and Related Programs Appropriations Act, 2014
21 (division K of Public Law 113–76; 128 Stat. 536) and
22 in consultation with the appropriate committees of Con-
23 gress.

24 (c) BURMA.—None of the amounts appropriated pur-
25 suant to subsection (a) may be made available for the pro-

1 grams, initiatives, or interactions that may benefit the de-
2 fense sector of the Republic of the Union of Myanmar (his-
3 torically known as “Burma”).

4 (d) PHILIPPINES.—Amounts appropriated pursuant
5 to subsection (a) may not be made available for counter-
6 narcotics assistance (other than maritime programs) for
7 the Philippine National Police unless the Secretary of
8 State certifies and reports to the appropriate committees
9 of Congress that the Government of the Philippines has
10 adopted and is implementing a counternarcotics strategy
11 that complies with international norms of due process.

12 (e) CAMBODIA.—Amounts appropriated pursuant to
13 subsection (a) may not be made available for certain
14 United States assistance programs that benefit the Gov-
15 ernment of Cambodia.

16 (f) DEFINED TERM.—In this section, the term “ap-
17 propriate committees of Congress” means—

18 (1) the Committee on Appropriations of the
19 Senate;

20 (2) the Committee on Foreign Relations of the
21 Senate;

22 (3) the Committee on Appropriations of the
23 House of Representatives; and

24 (4) the Committee on Foreign Affairs of the
25 House of Representatives.

1 **SEC. 102. TREATY ALLIANCES IN THE INDO-PACIFIC RE-**
2 **GION.**

3 (a) UNITED STATES-JAPAN ALLIANCE.—The United
4 States Government—

5 (1) is committed to the Treaty of Mutual Co-
6 operation and Security between the United States
7 and Japan, done at Washington, January 19, 1960,
8 and subsequent security agreements;

9 (2) recognizes the vital role of the alliance be-
10 tween the United States and Japan in promoting
11 peace and security in the Indo-Pacific region; and

12 (3) calls for the strengthening and broadening
13 of diplomatic, economic, and security ties between
14 the United States and Japan.

15 (b) UNITED STATES-REPUBLIC OF KOREA ALLI-
16 ANCE.—The United States Government—

17 (1) is committed to the Mutual Defense Treaty
18 Between the United States and the Republic of
19 Korea, done at Washington October 1, 1953, and
20 subsequent security agreements;

21 (2) recognizes the vital role of the alliance be-
22 tween the United States and South Korea in pro-
23 moting peace and security in the Indo-Pacific region;
24 and

1 (3) calls for the strengthening and broadening
2 of diplomatic, economic, and security ties between
3 the United States and the Republic of Korea.

4 (c) UNITED STATES-AUSTRALIA ALLIANCE.—The
5 United States Government—

6 (1) is committed to the Security Treaty Be-
7 tween Australia and the United States of America,
8 done at San Francisco September 1, 1951, and sub-
9 sequent security agreements between these 2 na-
10 tions;

11 (2) recognizes the vital role of the alliance be-
12 tween the United States and Australia in promoting
13 peace and security in the Indo-Pacific region; and

14 (3) calls for the strengthening and broadening
15 of diplomatic, economic, and security ties between
16 the United States and Australia.

17 (d) UNITED STATES-PHILIPPINES ALLIANCE.—The
18 United States Government is committed to the Mutual
19 Defense Treaty between the Republic of the Philippines
20 and the United States of America, done at Washington
21 August 30, 1951, and subsequent bilateral security agree-
22 ments, including the Enhanced Defense Cooperation
23 Agreement, done at Manila April 28, 2014.

24 (e) THAILAND.—The United States Government is
25 committed to—

1 (1) the Agreement Respecting Military Assist-
2 ance Between the Government of the United States
3 of America and the Government of Thailand, done
4 at Bangkok October 17, 1950;

5 (2) the Southeast Asia Collective Defense Trea-
6 ty, done at Manila September 8, 1954; and

7 (3) all subsequent bilateral security agreements,
8 including the Joint Vision Statement for the Thai-
9 U.S. Defense Alliance, issued in Bangkok November
10 15, 2012.

11 **SEC. 103. UNITED STATES-CHINA RELATIONSHIP.**

12 (a) IN GENERAL.—The United States Government—

13 (1) expresses grave concerns with Chinese ac-
14 tions that seek—

15 (A) to further constrain space for civil so-
16 ciety within China; and

17 (B) to undermine a rules-based order in
18 the Indo-Pacific region;

19 (2) encourages China to play a constructive role
20 in world affairs by demonstrating consistent respect
21 for the rule of law and international norms;

22 (3) seeks to build a positive, cooperative, and
23 comprehensive relationship with China—

24 (A) by expanding areas of cooperation; and

1 (B) by addressing areas of disagreement,
2 including over human rights, economic policies,
3 and maritime security; and

4 (4) is committed to working with China on
5 shared regional and global challenges, especially—

6 (A) upholding and strengthening the rules-
7 based international system; and

8 (B) the denuclearization of the Korean pe-
9 ninsula.

10 (b) SENSE OF CONGRESS.—It is the sense of Con-
11 gress that the United States should—

12 (1) welcome China’s decision to change course
13 and pursue responsible engagement on global issues;

14 (2) encourage China to play a constructive role
15 in the Indo-Pacific region and globally; and

16 (3) continue to call out Chinese actions that un-
17 dermine the rules-based international system.

18 **SEC. 104. UNITED STATES-INDIA STRATEGIC PARTNERSHIP.**

19 (a) IN GENERAL.—The United States Government—

20 (1) recognizes the vital role of the strategic
21 partnership between the United States and India in
22 promoting peace and security in the Indo-Pacific re-
23 gion;

1 (2) calls for the strengthening and broadening
2 of diplomatic, economic, and security ties between
3 the United States and India; and

4 (3) is committed to—

5 (A) the New Framework for the United
6 States-India Defense Relationship, done at Ar-
7 lington, Virginia June 28, 2005;

8 (B) the United States-India Defense Tech-
9 nology and Trade Initiative, launched in 2012;

10 (C) the Joint Strategic Vision for the Indo-
11 Pacific and Indian Ocean Region, announced on
12 January 25, 2015; and

13 (D) all related and subsequent bilateral
14 and security agreements.

15 (b) INDIA AS MAJOR DEFENSE PARTNER.—Congress
16 makes the following findings:

17 (1) Section 1292(a)(1)(A) of the National De-
18 fense Authorization Act for Fiscal Year 2017 (Pub-
19 lic Law 114–328; 130 Stat. 2559; 22 U.S.C. 2751
20 note) requires the recognition of India as a major
21 defense partner.

22 (2) The designation of India as a major defense
23 partner, which is unique to India—

1 (A) institutionalizes the progress made to
2 facilitate defense trade and technology sharing
3 between the United States and India;

4 (B) elevates defense trade and technology
5 cooperation between the United States and
6 India to a level commensurate with the closest
7 allies and partners of the United States;

8 (C) facilitates technology sharing between
9 the United States and India, including license-
10 free access to a wide range of dual-use tech-
11 nologies, after taking into account national se-
12 curity concerns; and

13 (D) facilitates joint exercises, coordination
14 on defense strategy and policy, military ex-
15 changes, and port calls in support of defense
16 cooperation between the United States and
17 India.

18 **SEC. 105. UNITED STATES–ASEAN STRATEGIC PARTNER-**
19 **SHIP.**

20 It is the sense of the Senate that the United States
21 should—

22 (1) support and affirm the elevation of the
23 United States–Association of Southeast Asian Na-
24 tions (ASEAN) relationship to a strategic partner-
25 ship;

1 (2) recommit to ASEAN centrality by helping
2 build a strong, stable, politically cohesive, economi-
3 cally integrated, and socially responsible community
4 of nations that has common rules, norms, proce-
5 dures, and standards which are consistent with
6 international law and the principles of a rules-based
7 Indo-Pacific community;

8 (3) urge ASEAN to continue its efforts to fos-
9 ter greater integration among its members;

10 (4) recognize the value of—

11 (A) ASEAN engagement with economic,
12 political, and security partners within Asia and
13 elsewhere, including Australia, Canada, the Eu-
14 ropean Union, India, Japan, New Zealand, Nor-
15 way, the Republic of Korea, and Taiwan; and

16 (B) strategic economic initiatives, such as
17 the U.S.-ASEAN Connect, which demonstrate a
18 commitment to ASEAN and the ASEAN Eco-
19 nomic Community and build upon economic re-
20 lationships in the Indo-Pacific region;

21 (5) support efforts by the nations comprising
22 ASEAN—

23 (A) to address maritime and territorial dis-
24 putes in a constructive manner; and

1 (B) to pursue claims through peaceful, dip-
2 lomatic, and legitimate regional and inter-
3 national arbitration mechanisms, consistent
4 with international law, including through the
5 adoption of a code of conduct in the South
6 China Sea to further promote peace and sta-
7 bility in the Indo-Pacific region;

8 (6) support efforts by United States partners
9 and allies in ASEAN—

10 (A) to enhance maritime capability and
11 maritime domain awareness;

12 (B) to protect unhindered access to, and
13 use of, international waterways in the Asia-Pa-
14 cific region that are critical to ensuring the se-
15 curity and free flow of commerce;

16 (C) to counter piracy;

17 (D) to disrupt illicit maritime trafficking
18 activities such as the trafficking of persons,
19 goods, and drugs; and

20 (E) to enhance the maritime capabilities of
21 countries or regional organizations to respond
22 to emerging threats to maritime security in the
23 Asia-Pacific region; and

24 (7) urge ASEAN member states to develop a
25 common approach to reaffirm the decision of the

1 Permanent Court of Arbitration’s ruling with respect
2 to the case between the Republic of the Philippines
3 and the People’s Republic of China.

4 **SEC. 106. UNITED STATES–REPUBLIC OF KOREA–JAPAN**
5 **TRILATERAL SECURITY PARTNERSHIP.**

6 It is the sense of Congress that the President should
7 develop a strategy to deepen the trilateral security co-
8 operation between the United States, South Korea, and
9 Japan, including missile defense, intelligence-sharing, and
10 other defense-related initiatives.

11 **SEC. 107. QUADRILATERAL SECURITY DIALOGUE.**

12 It is the sense of Congress that—

13 (1) the security dialogue between the United
14 States, Australia, India, and Japan is vital to ad-
15 dressing pressing security challenges in the Indo-Pa-
16 cific region in order to promote—

17 (A) a rules-based order;

18 (B) respect for international law; and

19 (C) a free and open Indo-Pacific; and

20 (2) such a dialogue is intended to augment,
21 rather than to replace, current mechanisms.

22 **SEC. 108. ENHANCED SECURITY PARTNERSHIPS IN SOUTH-**
23 **EAST ASIA.**

24 (a) INDONESIA.—The United States Government is
25 committed to—

1 (1) the U.S.–Indonesia Comprehensive Partner-
2 ship, done in Washington November 9, 2010;

3 (2) the Joint Statement on Comprehensive De-
4 fense Cooperation, done in Washington October 26,
5 2015; and

6 (3) all related and subsequent bilateral and se-
7 curity agreements between the United States and
8 Indonesia.

9 (b) MALAYSIA.—The United States Government is
10 committed to—

11 (1) the U.S.-Malaysia Comprehensive Partner-
12 ship, done at Putrajaya April 27, 2014;

13 (2) the Joint Statement for Enhancing the
14 Comprehensive Partnership between the United
15 States of America and Malaysia, done in Wash-
16 ington September 13, 2017; and

17 (3) all related and subsequent bilateral and se-
18 curity agreements between the United States and
19 Malaysia.

20 (c) SINGAPORE.—The United States Government is
21 committed to—

22 (1) the Strategic Framework Agreement Be-
23 tween the United States of America and the Repub-
24 lic of Singapore for a Closer Cooperation Partner-

1 ship in Defense and Security, done at Washington
2 July 12, 2005;

3 (2) the Enhanced Defense Cooperation Agree-
4 ment, done at Arlington, Virginia December 7,
5 2015; and

6 (3) all related and subsequent bilateral and se-
7 curity agreements between the United States and
8 Singapore.

9 (d) VIETNAM.—The United States Government is
10 committed to—

11 (1) the U.S.-Vietnam Comprehensive Partner-
12 ship, done at Washington December 16, 2013;

13 (2) the U.S.-Vietnam Joint Vision Statement
14 on Defense Relations, done at Hanoi on June 1,
15 2015;

16 (3) the U.S.-Vietnam Joint Vision Statement,
17 done at Washington May 31, 2017; and

18 (4) all related and subsequent bilateral and se-
19 curity agreements between the United States and
20 Vietnam.

21 (e) SENSE OF CONGRESS.—It is the sense of Con-
22 gress that the United States should deepen the diplomatic,
23 economic, and security cooperation, especially in the areas
24 of maritime security and counterterrorism, with Indonesia,
25 Malaysia, Singapore, and Vietnam.

1 **SEC. 109. COMMITMENT TO TAIWAN.**

2 (a) UNITED STATES COMMITMENT TO TAIWAN.—It
3 is the policy of the United States to faithfully enforce all
4 existing United States Government commitments to Tai-
5 wan, as enshrined in the Taiwan Relations Act of 1979
6 (Public Law 96–8) and the Six Assurances agreed to by
7 President Ronald Reagan in July 1982.

8 (b) ARMS SALES TO TAIWAN.—The President shall
9 conduct regular transfers of defense articles to Taiwan
10 that are tailored to meet the existing and likely future
11 threats from the People’s Republic of China, including
12 supporting the efforts of Taiwan to develop and integrate
13 asymmetric capabilities, including undersea warfare and
14 air defense capabilities, into its military forces.

15 (c) TRAVEL.—The President shall authorize the trav-
16 el of high-level United States officials to Taiwan, in ac-
17 cordance with the Taiwan Travel Act (Public Law 115–
18 135).

19 **SEC. 110. NORTH KOREA STRATEGY.**

20 (a) FINDINGS.—Congress makes the following find-
21 ings:

22 (1) The Government of the Democratic People’s
23 Republic of Korea has flagrantly defied the inter-
24 national community by illicitly developing its nuclear
25 and ballistic missile programs, in violation of United
26 Nations Security Council Resolutions 1718 (2006),

1 1874 (2009), 2087 (2013), 2094 (2013), 2270
2 (2016), 2321 (2016), 2371 (2017), 2375 (2017),
3 and 2397 (2017).

4 (2) The Government of the Democratic People's
5 Republic of Korea engages in gross human rights
6 abuses against its own people and citizens of other
7 countries, including the United States, the Republic
8 of Korea, and Japan.

9 (3) The United States is committed to pursuing
10 a peaceful denuclearization of the Democratic Peo-
11 ple's Republic of Korea through a policy of max-
12 imum pressure and engagement, in close concert
13 with its partners.

14 (b) POLICY OF THE UNITED STATES WITH RESPECT
15 TO SANCTIONS AGAINST THE DEMOCRATIC PEOPLE'S RE-
16 PUBLIC OF KOREA.—

17 (1) STATEMENT OF POLICY.—It is the policy of
18 the United States to continue to impose sanctions
19 with respect to activities of the Government of the
20 Democratic People's Republic of Korea, persons act-
21 ing for or on behalf of such government, or other
22 persons in accordance with Executive Order 13687
23 (50 U.S.C. 1701 note; relating to imposing addi-
24 tional sanctions with respect to North Korea), Exec-
25 utive Order 13694 (50 U.S.C. 1701 note; relating to

1 blocking the property of certain persons engaging in
2 significant malicious cyber-enabled activities), Exec-
3 utive Order 13722 (50 U.S.C. 1701 note; relating to
4 blocking the property of the Government of North
5 Korea and the Workers' Party of Korea, and prohib-
6 iting certain transactions with respect to North
7 Korea), and Executive Order 13810 (82 Fed. Reg.
8 44705; relating to imposing additional sanctions
9 with respect to North Korea), as such Executive Or-
10 ders are in effect on the day before the date of the
11 enactment of this Act, until the Democratic People's
12 Republic of Korea is no longer engaged in the illicit
13 activities described in such Executive Orders, includ-
14 ing actions in violation of United Nations Security
15 Council Resolutions 1718 (2006), 1874 (2009),
16 2087 (2013), 2094 (2013), 2270 (2016), 2321
17 (2016), 2371 (2017), and 2375 (2017).

18 (2) REPORT.—Not later than 30 days after ter-
19 minating any sanction with respect to the activities
20 of the Government of the Democratic People's Re-
21 public of Korea, a person acting for or on behalf of
22 such government, or any other person provided for
23 in an Executive order listed in subsection (a), the
24 Secretary of State shall submit a report to the ap-
25 propriate congressional committees regarding the

1 cessation of any illicit activity that violates United
2 Nations Security Council Resolution 1718 (2006),
3 1874 (2009), 2087 (2013), 2094 (2013), 2270
4 (2016), 2321 (2016), 2371 (2017), or 2375 (2017)
5 by such Government or person.

6 (3) RULE OF CONSTRUCTION.—Nothing in this
7 subsection shall be construed to limit the authority
8 of the President pursuant to the International
9 Emergency Economic Powers Act (50 U.S.C. 1701
10 et seq.).

11 (c) POLICY OF THE UNITED STATES WITH RESPECT
12 TO NEGOTIATION ON THE DEMOCRATIC PEOPLE’S RE-
13 PUBLIC OF KOREA’S NUCLEAR AND BALLISTIC MISSILE
14 PROGRAMS.—It is the policy of the United States that the
15 objective of negotiations with respect to the nuclear and
16 ballistic missile programs of the Democratic People’s Re-
17 public of Korea be the complete, verifiable, and irreversible
18 dismantlement of such programs.

19 (d) REPORT ON A STRATEGY TO ADDRESS THE
20 THREATS POSED BY, AND THE CAPABILITIES OF, THE
21 DEMOCRATIC PEOPLE’S REPUBLIC OF KOREA.—

22 (1) IN GENERAL.—Not later than 90 days after
23 the date of the enactment of this Act, and every 180
24 days thereafter, the Secretary of State, or a designee
25 of the Secretary, shall submit a report to the appro-

1 appropriate congressional committees that describes ac-
2 tions taken by the United States to address the
3 threats posed by, and the capabilities of, the Demo-
4 cratic People’s Republic of Korea.

5 (2) ELEMENTS.—Each report required under
6 paragraph (1) shall include—

7 (A) a summary of ongoing efforts by the
8 United States to identify strategies and policies,
9 including an assessment of the strengths and
10 weaknesses of such strategies and policies—

11 (i) to achieve peaceful
12 denuclearization of the Korean Peninsula;
13 and

14 (ii) to eliminate the threat posed by
15 the ballistic missile program of the Demo-
16 cratic People’s Republic of Korea;

17 (B) an assessment of—

18 (i) potential road maps toward peace-
19 ful denuclearization of the Korean Penin-
20 sula and the elimination of the nuclear and
21 ballistic missile threats posed by the
22 Democratic People’s Republic of Korea;
23 and

24 (ii) specific actions that the Demo-
25 cratic People’s Republic of Korea would

1 need to take for each such roadmap to be-
2 come viable;

3 (C) a summary of the United States strat-
4 egy to increase international coordination and
5 cooperation, whether unilaterally, bilaterally, or
6 multilaterally, including sanctions enforcement
7 and interdiction, to address the threat posed by
8 the nuclear and ballistic missile programs of the
9 Democratic People’s Republic of Korea, which
10 shall include—

11 (i) a description of the actions taken
12 by the Secretary of State, or designees of
13 the Secretary, to consult with governments
14 around the world, with the purpose of in-
15 ducing such governments to diplomatically
16 and economically isolate the Democratic
17 People’s Republic of Korea;

18 (ii) a description of the actions taken
19 by such governments to implement meas-
20 ures to diplomatically and economically iso-
21 late the Democratic People’s Republic of
22 Korea;

23 (iii) a list of countries with govern-
24 ments that the Secretary has determined
25 are noncooperative with respect to imple-

1 menting measures to diplomatically and
2 economically isolate the Democratic Peo-
3 ple's Republic of Korea; and

4 (iv) a plan of action to engage, and
5 increase cooperation with respect to the
6 Democratic People's Republic of Korea,
7 with the governments of the countries on
8 the list described in clause (iii); and

9 (D) an assessment of the adequacy of the
10 national export control regimes of countries
11 that are members of the United Nations, and
12 multilateral export control regimes, that are
13 necessary to enforce sanctions imposed with re-
14 spect to the Democratic People's Republic of
15 Korea pursuant to United Nations Security
16 Council resolutions; and

17 (E) an action plan to encourage and assist
18 countries in adopting and using authorities nec-
19 essary to enforce export controls required by
20 United Nations Security Council resolutions.

21 (3) FORM OF REPORT.—Each report required
22 under this subsection shall be submitted in unclassi-
23 fied form, but may include a classified annex.

24 (e) SENSE OF CONGRESS.—It is the sense of Con-
25 gress that—

1 (1) representatives of the United States shall
2 use the voice and vote of the United States in all
3 international organizations, as appropriate, to advo-
4 cate for the expulsion of the Democratic People’s
5 Republic of Korea from such organizations, until
6 such time as the Democratic People’s Republic of
7 Korea meets its commitments under United Nations
8 Security Council Resolutions 1718 (2006), 1874
9 (2009), 2087 (2013), 2094 (2013), 2270 (2016),
10 2321 (2016), 2371 (2017), 2375 (2017), and 2397
11 (2017);

12 (2) the Secretary of State may take such ac-
13 tions as are necessary to induce countries to take
14 measures to diplomatically and economically isolate
15 the Democratic People’s Republic of Korea, includ-
16 ing—

17 (A) reducing the diplomatic presence in the
18 United States of countries with governments
19 that the Secretary has determined are non-
20 cooperative with respect to implementing meas-
21 ures to diplomatically and economically isolate
22 the Democratic People’s Republic of Korea; and

23 (B) reducing the diplomatic presence of
24 the United States in such countries; and

1 (3) the Secretary of State may terminate or re-
2 duce United States foreign assistance to countries
3 enabling the Democratic People’s Republic of Korea.

4 **SEC. 111. NEW ZEALAND AND THE PACIFIC ISLANDS.**

5 It is the sense of Congress that—

6 (1) the United States supports strengthening
7 diplomatic, economic, and the security relationship
8 with New Zealand;

9 (2) the United States supports strong United
10 States engagement with the nations of the South
11 Pacific, including Fiji, Kiribati, the Marshall Is-
12 lands, the Federated States of Micronesia, Nauru,
13 Palau, Papua New Guinea, Samoa, the Solomon Is-
14 lands Tonga, Tuvalu, and Vanuatu;

15 (3) the United States recognizes the strong his-
16 torical, strategic and cultural ties to these countries;

17 (4) the United States should deepen its co-
18 operation with New Zealand and the nations of the
19 South Pacific in areas of mutual interest, includ-
20 ing—

21 (A) fisheries and marine resource con-
22 servation;

23 (B) environmental challenges and resil-
24 ience;

25 (C) global health;

1 (D) development and trade; and

2 (E) people-to-people ties; and

3 (5) the United States should provide robust for-
4 eign assistance to the Pacific islands.

5 **SEC. 112. FREEDOM OF NAVIGATION AND OVERFLIGHT;**
6 **PROMOTION OF INTERNATIONAL LAW.**

7 (a) **FREEDOM OF NAVIGATION.**—It is the policy of
8 the United States—

9 (1) to conduct, as part of its global Freedom of
10 Navigation Program, regular freedom of navigation
11 and overflight operations in the Indo-Pacific region,
12 in accordance with applicable international law; and

13 (2) to promote genuine multilateral negotiations
14 to peacefully resolve maritime disputes in the South
15 China Sea, in accordance with applicable inter-
16 national law.

17 (b) **JOINT INDO-PACIFIC DIPLOMATIC STRATEGY.**—

18 It is the sense of Congress that the President should de-
19 velop a diplomatic strategy that includes working with
20 United States allies and partners to conduct joint mari-
21 time training and freedom of navigation operations in the
22 Indo-Pacific region, including the East China Sea and the
23 South China Sea, in support of a rules-based international
24 system benefitting all countries.

1 **SEC. 113. COMBATING TERRORISM IN SOUTHEAST ASIA.**

2 (a) REPORT.—Not later than 180 days after the date
3 of the enactment of this Act, the Director of National In-
4 telligence, in consultation with the Secretary of State, the
5 Secretary of Defense, and other appropriate officials, shall
6 submit a report to the appropriate committees of Congress
7 that contains an assessment of the current and future ca-
8 pabilities and activities of ISIS-linked, al-Qaeda-linked,
9 and other violent extremist groups in Southeast Asia that
10 pose a significant threat to the United States, its allies,
11 and its citizens interests abroad.

12 (b) ELEMENTS.—The report required under sub-
13 section (a) shall include—

14 (1) the current number of ISIS-linked, al-
15 Qaeda-linked, and other violent extremist group-af-
16 filiated fighters in Southeast Asia;

17 (2) the estimated number of ISIS-linked, al-
18 Qaeda-linked, and other violent extremist group-af-
19 filiated fighters expected to return to Southeast Asia
20 from fighting in the Middle East;

21 (3) the current resources available to combat
22 the threat of ISIS-linked, al-Qaeda-linked, and other
23 violent extremist group-affiliated fighters in South-
24 east Asia, and the additional resources required to
25 combat such threat;

1 (4) a detailed assessment of the capabilities of
2 ISIS-linked, al-Qaeda-linked, and other violent ex-
3 tremist group-affiliated fighters to operate effectively
4 in countries such as the Philippines, Indonesia, and
5 Malaysia;

6 (5) a description of the capabilities and re-
7 sources of governments in Southeast Asia to counter
8 violent extremist groups; and

9 (6) a list of additional United States resources
10 and capabilities that the Department of Defense rec-
11 ommends providing to governments in Southeast
12 Asia to combat violent extremist groups.

13 (c) DEFINITIONS.—In this section—

14 (1) the term “appropriate committees of Con-
15 gress” means—

16 (A) the Committee on Armed Services of
17 the Senate;

18 (B) the Committee on Foreign Relations of
19 the Senate;

20 (C) the Committee on Armed Services of
21 the House of Representatives; and

22 (D) the Committee on Foreign Affairs of
23 the House of Representatives; and

24 (2) the term “ISIS” means the Islamic State of
25 Iraq and Syria.

1 **SEC. 114. CYBERSECURITY COOPERATION.**

2 (a) SENSE OF CONGRESS.—It is the sense of Con-
3 gress that there should be robust cybersecurity coopera-
4 tion between the United States and nations in the Indo-
5 Pacific region—

6 (1) to effectively respond to cybersecurity
7 threats, including state-sponsored threats;

8 (2) to share best practices to combat such
9 threats; and

10 (3) to strengthen resilience against misinforma-
11 tion and propaganda.

12 (b) AUTHORIZATION OF APPROPRIATIONS.—There
13 are authorized to be appropriated such sums as may be
14 necessary—

15 (1) to build capacity for responding to cyberse-
16 curity threats originating in the Indo-Pacific region;
17 and

18 (2) to enhance cooperation between the United
19 States and nations in such region for combating
20 such threats.

21 **SEC. 115. NUCLEAR NONPROLIFERATION AND ARMS CON-**
22 **TROL IN THE INDO-PACIFIC REGION.**

23 (a) IN GENERAL.—The United States Government—

24 (1) recognizes that the spread of nuclear weap-
25 ons, and their means of delivery, constitutes a threat
26 to international peace and security;

1 (2) seeks to peacefully address the unique chal-
2 lenge posed to regional and global stability by the il-
3 licit use, and the proliferation to and from North
4 Korea, of sensitive nuclear and missile technologies;

5 (3) notes efforts by China and Russia—

6 (A) to expand and modernize their respec-
7 tive nuclear arsenals; and

8 (B) to pursue sales of commercial nuclear
9 technologies; and

10 (4) recognizes the legitimate pursuit by many
11 countries in the Indo-Pacific region of nuclear en-
12 ergy for a variety of peaceful applications.

13 (b) SENSE OF CONGRESS.—It is the sense of Con-
14 gress that the United States Government should under-
15 take all reasonable and appropriate efforts to pursue effec-
16 tive arms control and nuclear nonproliferation policies in
17 the Indo-Pacific region to limit the further spread of po-
18 tentially dangerous and destabilizing conventional and nu-
19 clear weapons.

1 **TITLE II—PROMOTING UNITED**
2 **STATES ECONOMIC INTER-**
3 **ESTS IN THE INDO-PACIFIC**
4 **REGION**

5 **SEC. 201. FINDINGS; SENSE OF CONGRESS.**

6 (a) FINDINGS.—Congress makes the following find-
7 ings:

8 (1) According to the United States Chamber of
9 Commerce, by 2030—

10 (A) 66 percent of the global middle class
11 population will be in Asia; and

12 (B) 59 percent of middle class consump-
13 tion will be in Asia.

14 (2) According to the Asian Development
15 Bank—

16 (A) Asian countries have signed 140 bilat-
17 eral or regional trade agreements; and

18 (B) 75 more trade agreements with Asian
19 countries are under negotiation or concluded
20 and awaiting entry into force.

21 (3) The United States has signed free trade
22 agreements with 3 nations in the Indo-Pacific re-
23 gion, namely Australia, Singapore, and the Republic
24 of Korea.

1 (4) The member states of the Association of
2 Southeast Asian Nations (referred to in this section
3 as “ASEAN”), as a group—

4 (A) represent the fifth largest economy in
5 the world; and

6 (B) have a combined gross domestic prod-
7 uct of \$2,400,000,000,000.

8 (5) The economy comprised of ASEAN member
9 states grew by 66 percent between 2006 and 2015,
10 and the total value of bilateral trade between the
11 United States and ASEAN member states has in-
12 creased by 78 percent since 2004.

13 (6) In 2015, the trade surplus of goods sold by
14 companies in ASEAN member states to consumers
15 in the United States was \$77,000,000,000, while the
16 United States 2015 trade surplus of services pro-
17 vided to consumers in ASEAN member states was
18 \$8,000,000,000.

19 (7) According to US-ASEAN Business Council,
20 Inc., goods and services exported from the United
21 States to ASEAN member states support 550,000
22 jobs in the United States.

23 (8) According to the Business Roundtable—

24 (A) the United States, Australia, Brunei,
25 Canada, Chile, Japan, Malaysia, Mexico, New

1 Zealand, Peru, Singapore and Vietnam were re-
2 sponsible for a combined 40 percent of global
3 gross domestic product in 2017; and

4 (B) United States bilateral trade with the
5 other nations referred to in subparagraph (A)
6 supports 15,600,000 jobs in the United States.

7 (9) According to the United States National Se-
8 curity Strategy—

9 (A) ASEAN and Asia-Pacific Economic
10 Cooperation (APEC) “remain centerpieces of
11 the Indo-Pacific’s regional architecture and
12 platforms for promoting an order based on free-
13 dom”; and

14 (B) the United States will “work with
15 partners to build a network of states dedicated
16 to free markets and protected from forces that
17 would subvert their sovereignty.”.

18 (b) SENSE OF CONGRESS.—It is the sense of Con-
19 gress that trade between the United States and the na-
20 tions in the Indo-Pacific region is vitally important to the
21 United States economy, United States exports, and jobs
22 in the United States.

23 **SEC. 202. TRADE NEGOTIATIONS, MULTILATERAL AGREE-**
24 **MENTS, AND REGIONAL ECONOMIC SUMMITS.**

25 Congress supports—

1 (1) multilateral, bilateral, or regional trade
2 agreements that increase United States employment
3 and expand the economy;

4 (2) formal economic dialogues that include con-
5 crete outcomes;

6 (3) high-standard bilateral investment treaties
7 between the United States and nations in the Indo-
8 Pacific region;

9 (4) negotiations of the Trade in Services Agree-
10 ment and the Environmental Goods Agreement that
11 include several major Asian economies; and

12 (5) the proactive, strategic, and continuing
13 high-level use of the Asia-Pacific Economic Coopera-
14 tion forum, the East Asia Summit, and the Group
15 of 20 to pursue United States economic objectives in
16 the Indo-Pacific region.

17 **SEC. 203. UNITED STATES–ASEAN ECONOMIC PARTNER-**
18 **SHIP.**

19 The President, acting through the United States
20 Trade Representative, is authorized to negotiate a com-
21 prehensive economic engagement framework with the As-
22 sociation of Southeast Asian Nations.

1 **SEC. 204. TRADE CAPACITY BUILDING AND TRADE FACILI-**
2 **TATION.**

3 (a) IN GENERAL.—The President is encouraged to
4 produce a robust and comprehensive trade capacity build-
5 ing and trade facilitation strategy for the Indo-Pacific re-
6 gion.

7 (b) AUTHORIZATION OF APPROPRIATIONS.—There
8 are authorized to be appropriated such amounts as may
9 be necessary to carry out subsection (a).

10 **SEC. 205. INTELLECTUAL PROPERTY PROTECTION.**

11 (a) IN GENERAL.—The President is encouraged to
12 impose penalties on all entities found to be complicit in
13 the theft of United States intellectual property, in accord-
14 ance with applicable law, including commercial cyber-en-
15 abled theft.

16 (b) ANNUAL REPORT.—Not later than 180 days after
17 the date of the enactment of this Act, and annually there-
18 after, the President shall submit a report to Congress
19 that—

20 (1) describes the efforts of the United States
21 Government to combat intellectual property and
22 commercial cyber-enabled theft in the Indo-Pacific
23 region, particularly the People’s Republic of China;
24 and

1 (2) includes a country-by-country assessment of
2 priority areas for United States engagement and ca-
3 pacity building assistance.

4 (c) AUTHORIZATION OF APPROPRIATIONS.—There
5 are authorized to be appropriated such amounts as may
6 be necessary to sponsor bilateral and multilateral activities
7 designed to build capacity in the identified priority areas
8 described in the annual report required under subsection
9 (b).

10 **SEC. 206. ENERGY PROGRAMS AND INITIATIVES.**

11 (a) INDO-PACIFIC ENERGY STRATEGY.—

12 (1) STRATEGY.—Not later than 180 days after
13 the date of the enactment of this Act, and annually
14 thereafter, the Secretary of State, in consultation
15 with the Secretary of Energy, shall create a United
16 States Government strategy to increase United
17 States exports of energy to the nations in the Indo-
18 Pacific region.

19 (2) AUTHORIZATION OF APPROPRIATIONS.—
20 There are authorized to be appropriated such
21 amounts as may be necessary to carry out para-
22 graph (1).

23 (b) RELIABLE ENERGY PARTNERSHIPS.—It is the
24 sense of Congress that—

1 (1) the President should establish bilateral and
2 regional initiatives to increase energy security in the
3 Indo-Pacific region;

4 (2) the United States should authorize the sup-
5 ply of liquefied natural gas to the nations in the
6 Indo-Pacific region; and

7 (3) the United States should create a dedicated
8 program, in partnership with the private sector and
9 multilateral institutions, such as the World Bank
10 and the Asian Development Bank, to promote uni-
11 versal access to reliable electricity in Myanmar (his-
12 torically known as “Burma”).

13 **SEC. 207. LOWER MEKONG INITIATIVE.**

14 The Secretary of State, in cooperation with the Ad-
15 ministrator of the United States Agency for International
16 Development, should increase regional engagement in the
17 areas of environment, health, education, and infrastruc-
18 ture development with the Lower Mekong countries, in-
19 cluding—

20 (1) assisting to develop programs that focus on
21 forecasting environmental challenges and resilience;

22 (2) assisting with transnational cooperation on
23 sustainable uses of forest and water resources with
24 the goal of preserving the biodiversity of the Mekong
25 Basin and access to safe drinking water;

1 (3) assisting with education enrollment and
2 broadband internet connectivity, particularly English
3 training and connectivity in rural communities; and

4 (4) improving global health in the Lower
5 Mekong countries, including—

6 (A) reducing the HIV/AIDS infection rate;

7 and

8 (B) helping regional partners to track and
9 treat malaria and tuberculosis.

10 **TITLE III—PROMOTING UNITED**
11 **STATES VALUES IN THE INDO-**
12 **PACIFIC REGION**

13 **SEC. 301. FINDINGS.**

14 Congress finds that—

15 (1) the promotion of human rights and respect
16 for democratic values in the Indo-Pacific region is in
17 the United States national security interests;

18 (2) there are serious concerns with the rule of
19 law and civil liberties in Cambodia, China, North
20 Korea, Laos, Thailand, and Vietnam, which have all
21 been identified by Freedom House as “Not Free”;

22 (3) there have been recent disturbing human
23 rights developments in—

1 (A) Burma (Myanmar), which has been
2 identified by Freedom House as “Not Free”;
3 and

4 (B) the Philippines, which has been identi-
5 fied by Freedom House as “Partly Free”; and

6 (4) according to the National Security Strategy,
7 the United States—

8 (A) will “support, with our words and ac-
9 tions, those who live under oppressive regimes
10 and who seek freedom, individual dignity, and
11 the rule of law”;

12 (B) “may use diplomacy, sanctions, and
13 other tools to isolate states and leaders who
14 threaten our interests and whose actions run
15 contrary to our values”; and

16 (C) “will support efforts to advance wom-
17 en’s equality, protect the rights of women and
18 girls, and promote women and youth empower-
19 ment programs.”.

20 **SEC. 302. TRAFFICKING-IN-PERSONS.**

21 The President is encouraged to pursue additional ef-
22 forts to combat trafficking in persons and human slavery
23 in the Indo-Pacific region.

1 **SEC. 303. BILATERAL AND REGIONAL DIALOGUES; PEOPLE-**
2 **TO-PEOPLE ENGAGEMENT.**

3 The Secretary of State should—

4 (1) establish high-level bilateral and regional
5 dialogues with nations in the Indo-Pacific region re-
6 garding human rights and religious freedom viola-
7 tions;

8 (2) establish or support robust, people-to-people
9 exchange programs in the Indo-Pacific region, par-
10 ticularly programs engaging young leaders; and

11 (3) establish educational exchanges and capac-
12 ity-building programs emphasizing civil society devel-
13 opment.

14 **SEC. 304. IMPOSITION OF SANCTIONS AND SUSPENSION OF**
15 **UNITED STATES ASSISTANCE.**

16 (a) **SANCTIONS.**—The President is authorized to im-
17 pose sanctions, in accordance with applicable law, includ-
18 ing financial penalties and visa bans, on any individual
19 or entity that—

20 (1) violates human rights or religious freedoms;

21 or

22 (2) engages in censorship activities.

23 (b) **SUSPENSION OF FOREIGN ASSISTANCE.**—The
24 President is authorized, in accordance with applicable law,
25 to terminate, suspend, or otherwise alter United States

1 economic assistance to any country that has engaged in
2 serious violations of human rights or religious freedoms.

3 **SEC. 305. AUTHORIZATION OF APPROPRIATIONS.**

4 (a) PROMOTION OF DEMOCRACY IN THE INDO-PA-
5 CIFIC REGION.—

6 (1) IN GENERAL.—There is authorized to be
7 appropriated \$150,000,000, for each of the fiscal
8 years 2019 through 2023, to promote democracy,
9 strengthen civil society, human rights, rule of law,
10 transparency, and accountability in the Indo-Pacific
11 region.

12 (2) DEMOCRACY IN CHINA.—Amounts appro-
13 priated pursuant to paragraph (1) shall be made
14 available for United States Government efforts, led
15 by the Assistant Secretary of State for Democracy,
16 Human Rights, and Labor, to promote democracy,
17 the rule of law, and human rights in the People's
18 Republic of China.

19 (3) TIBET.—Amounts appropriated pursuant to
20 paragraph (1) shall be made available for non-
21 governmental organizations to support activities pre-
22 serving cultural traditions and promoting sustainable
23 development, education, and environmental conserva-
24 tion in Tibetan communities in the Tibet Autono-

1 mous Region and in other Tibetan communities in
2 China, India, and Nepal.

3 (b) FREEDOM OF INFORMATION TO NORTH
4 KOREA.—

5 (1) IN GENERAL.—There is authorized to be
6 appropriated \$10,000,000, for each of the fiscal
7 years 2019 through 2023, to implement programs to
8 enhance freedom of information efforts with regard
9 to North Korea.

10 (2) REPORT.—Not later than 180 days after
11 the date of the enactment of this Act, and every 180
12 days thereafter through September 30, 2023, the
13 Broadcasting Board of Governors shall submit a re-
14 port to Congress that describes the implementation
15 of the programs described in paragraph (1).